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INTRODUCTION
Former Yugoslavia was a small country on the Balkan
peninsula in south-east Europe - one of the most
ethnically, linguistically, and religiously
complicated areas of the world. Its peoples have
gained dark fame for the first time in their history
during the second decade of the twentieth century,
causing the first world-wide war ever. The other
event that brought the area into the spotlight was
the civil war in Croatia and Bosnia, two of the six
former Yugoslav republics - the others are Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The civil strife,
lasting from 1991 to the end of 1995, was in many
ways specific: it took place very close to the heart
of multicultural and multiconfessional Europe,
between people who were members of well-established
world religions: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam.
Also, this war was waged by people who, until
yesterday, lived peacefully together for decades, and
suddenly began facing each other with weapons - a
very sharp contrast, and a reason for alarm, to the
young uniting Europe making its first steps. All of

these sorrowful events make this country an
interesting and rich field of study.
This paper will try to cover the history of
Christianity and ethnicity of peoples in this
territory, and their mutual relationship, from the
sixth century onward. The extensive chronological
parts cannot offer a full explanation nor a solution
for the recent fratricide, but they might be helpful
in pointing out the reasons for division, in order to
make them useful in future prevention of conflicts. A
special attention has been paid to the peace
initiatives of the churches during the civil war, for
a very simple reason that the negative attitudes and
statements have always been made known and often even
abused by the press and the conflicting sides. The
final sections have been devoted to the peace accord
of the former Yugoslav war and the prospects of the
reconciliation process between the Yugoslav peoples
and their respective churches.
PART ONE: FORMATION OF NATIONS
THE FIRST SETTLERS
The story of South Slav peoples goes back as far as the
sixth century, when a group of Slavic tribes came to this
region. The Slavs belong to the Indo-European group of
peoples whose origin is from East and Central Europe. They
began to cross the Danube river to settle into the Balkans
permanently. These tribes are the ancestors of Bosnian
people today, and this is an explanation why three ethnic
groups that played the most important roles in the Yugoslav
conflict, Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs speak the same
language. One of the answers why, then, the tribes have not
developed into one single group lies in the Bosnian
geography. Namely, Bosnia is a mountainous country, and the
physical impassability of the mountain ranges enabled
communication between the groups of peoples, and therefore
the tribes were at first divided into two groups. On the
other hand, it was a region surrounded by two powerful
forces, the Eastern and Western parts of the Roman Empire.
It did not take much for the invaders to fall under their
neighbours' cultural and religious influence. At that time
the division of the declining Roman Empire already existed
and manifested itself very strongly. The borderline ran
through the middle of Bosnia, from Lake Skutori in the south
to river Sava in the north, and it is interesting to note
that it almost follows the contemporary division line
between the ethnic groups in Bosnia. The first records of

separate groups of Serbs and Croats date from the eighth
century.
CATHOLICISM, ORTHODOXY AND ISLAM
After the great schism in 1054 the two branches of the Roman
Empire became two branches of Christianity. Following the
geographical division, Slovenia and Croatia in the west were
Roman Catholic, and Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia in the
east became Orthodox. Again due to the geography, Bosnia
remained out of the domination of any of these spheres of
influence. In the further course of history, in the 12th
century, Croatia and Bosnia fell under the harsh rule of
Catholic Hungary. At almost the same time, in the 13th
century, the first Serbian independent kingdom was
established with hegemony over much of the Balkans. The
first bishop of the autonomous Serbian Church was Saint
Sava, who is considered to be the father of both Serbian
Orthodoxy and Serbian statehood. Nevertheless, the reign did
not last long - at the end of the 14th century the Ottoman
Turks, an Asiatic people from Asia Minor, invaded the whole
Byzantium, conquering chronologically Macedonia, Serbia,
Montenegro and Bosnia. This Islamic empire ruled the Balkans
for the next five hundred years. At the same time, Hungarian
Empire merged with the Catholic Hapsburg regime from
Austria, and these two big empires confronted each other for
centuries in the Bosnian area. T. R. Gurr makes an
interesting comparison of Serbs and Croats as brothers
separated at birth:
"Many of the ethnic distinctions among the Southern Slavs of
modern Yugoslavia can be traced to the arbitrary nature of
imperial boundaries: Croats and Serbs of Yugoslavia ... are
much like twins separated at birth....The Croats were
subjected to harsher Hungarian suzerainty and the Serbs most
often found themselves at the mercy of the Ottomans" (1)
THE OTTOMAN HERITAGE
The reign of Ottomans brought an important change in the
religious milieu, because the new rulers also brought their
religion, Islam. By the means of the millet system, where
the population of the vast empire was divided not along
linguistic but religious lines, the Ottoman rulers managed
to run a multinational and non-assimilative state. When
talking about the Ottoman rule, it must be stressed that it
was rather tolerant toward other religions. All Christians
were obliged to pay a tax called haradj, but that was their
only obligation. Christians were considered to be a national
and a religious minority, and the patriarch was at the same
time considered to be the ethnarch, the leader of his
people. Islamization was not done by force, and it was for
that reason that both Orthodoxy and Catholicism survived,

but the privileged positions, nobility and riches were still
kept for Muslims only. It led to many cases of voluntary
conversion to Islam, and these were the origins of Bosnian
Muslims today. In the meanwhile, the Catholic people living
in Bosnia identified themselves with ethnic Croats, and the
Orthodox with ethnic Serbs. The three neighbouring groups
lived peacefully, yet, in the words of a contemporary
Bosnian historian,
"For centuries the two communities, the Bosnian Muslims and
the Christian rayah, lived not together but alongside each
other. "(2)
Nevertheless, with the time the Ottoman system, that was
very efficient at the beginning, was becoming more and more
corrupted, the fact that was very much reflected in the
position of the oppressed rayah (a common name for Christian
serfs). In 1856, Sultan Abdul Medjid issued Gatti-Gamayun,
which stated that Christians were granted the same rights as
Muslims. In practice, this "liberation" meant that,
"Now they were obliged to count solely on their own
resources, even lost many of their former rights and
privileges." (3)
PRECEDING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The new treatment resulted in the whole second half of the
19th century characterised by Christian uprisings and
Turkish retaliation. The very end of the century announced
the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Serbia became an
independent state, while Bosnia was annexed to Austria. At
the beginning, Bosnian Serbs saw the new rulers as saviours
from Islam, but soon were faced with new ways of oppression
and proselytism. The end of the 19th century and the first
years of the forthcoming one were also marked by the birth
of the Yugoslav idea - union of all Slavic peoples into a
common state. Yet, the displeasure of Serbian side with the
treatment of Austrian government culminated in the
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand by young
Serb nationalists, during his visit to Sarajevo, the Bosnian
capital, in 1914. As reprisal, Austria attacked Serbia,
Great Britain and Russia took Serbian side, and that was the
beginning of the First World War that lasted until 1918.
THE BIRTH OF THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA
With Austria and its allies defeated, the South Slav peoples
finally found themselves in one state, named at first the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and renamed after
four years into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ("land of South
Slavs"). It was based on the Serbian monarchy system, and

started falling apart with the rise of fascism and
nationalism. What were the reasons behind this union of
peoples that have never been united before, since their
arrival to the area? Here is a possible answer, given by
Latinka Perovic:
"The Serbs identified themselves with Yugoslavia, perceiving
it as their state, that is, for all intents and purposes, as
an extended Serbia. The Croats and the Slovenes embraced
Yugoslavia as a political solution based on their own
political aspirations and political realism, given the
correlation of forces at the end of the First World War. But
they did not embrace Yugoslavhood as an idea of national
unity." (4)
The kingdom was confronted with two very different
adversaries - various national groups, who opposed the idea
of unity, and the growing Communist Party that demanded the
change of the political system. King Alexander was
assassinated in 1934, and his son was only ten years old
when he came to the throne.
PART TWO: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH
CAIN, ABEL AND THE PARTISANS
The World War II came to Yugoslavia in April 1941, when
Belgrade was severely bombed by German air forces, which was
a reaction to the great anti-Nazi demonstrations that had
been organised two weeks earlier. The king and his
government fled from the country, leaving chaos behind them.
Croatia and Bosnia were united in the Independent Republic
of Croatia that supported Nazis, Serbia was a puppet state
run by the supporters of German occupiers, and all the other
parts of Yugoslavia were taken by the surrounding countries.
Still, at the very beginning of the war, the Yugoslav
Communist Party led by Josip Broz Tito managed to mobilise
people from all over the country who were against the
occupation, and organised them into a resistance net and
armed troops known as partisans. Partisans were guerrilla
fighters who cherished the idea of the united country and
were helped by Great Britain on that account. The movement
grew stronger with time, and the end of the war found them
as winners.
Although it ended in 1945, the World War II will remain a
very painful memory in the history of Yugoslav peoples, due
to the sorrowful fact that hundreds of thousands of people
were killed not only by the occupiers, but also by the
military forces of each ethnic group against the members of
the other ones. There is a very strong disagreement between
the two churches on the exact number of victims on Serb
side. In the period from 1941-45 a great number of Serb

civilians was killed in the area of the then Independent
Republic of Croatia. The Croat side ventured into
underestimation, talking about tens of thousands of victims.
On the other side, Serbs talked about 1.3 million people,
and the solution was found in arithmetics - the official
Yugoslav figure was about 700.000 people. On the Serbian
side, there is a strong belief that these atrocities, that
included massive deaths of Serbs in Croat concentration
camps, can and should never be forgotten, and this issue was
brought to surface again during the civil war. Here is an
excerpt from an article published in 1992, in the official
newsletter of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the US and
Canada:
"Even Pope John Paul II in a recent letter to His Holiness
Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church said in
reference to genocide, 'the difficult heritage of the past
is deeply ingrained in the souls of one and the other (Serbs
and Croats)'. Such an innocuous reference, and the ease with
which he equates state-organised genocide with sporadic
resistance and reprisal, ignores the importance of
condemning this horrendous crime against humanity! As long
as there is no acknowledgement of the truth, there can be no
reconciliation." (5)
Another example of the strength of this unhealed wound comes
from the letter written in 1991 by Patriarch Pavle to the
chairman of the European Union, Hans Van Der Broek:
"After the Second World War, no one forced the Jews to live
together with the Germans in a common state. The Serbs,
however, were forced to live together with the Croats,
admittedly within the boundaries of Yugoslavia." (6)
Yet, one of the facts that are often foreseen is that there
have been several official apologies on the side of the
Roman Catholic Church of Croatia. The first important
statement was made by Bishop Pihler in 1963:
"In this country, during the last war, many of our Orthodox
brothers were killed just because they were Orthodox. Those
who have committed these murders were baptised and were
called Catholics. These Christians have killed other people,
also Christians, because they were not Croats and Catholics.
With pain we admit this terrible error of these lost people,
and we beg our brothers of the Orthodox faith for
forgiveness, as Christ on the cross has forgiven all. Also
we forgive all who have perhaps hated us and who have done
injustices to us." (7)
Also, not long before the beginning of the civil war, in
1990, Cardinal Kuharic of Croatia wrote in a letter to
Patriarch German:

"We regret and condemn all crimes that sons of the Croatian
people, on whatever side or under whatever flag they were,
have committed against the Serbian and other peoples."(8)
Unfortunately, it is mostly the case that statements of
goodwill are often not well-known to the public.
THE COMMUNIST RULE
Nevertheless, the war ended in 1945, and the Communist Party
was now ruling the country, which was after several changes
named the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (9),
with J. B. Tito as the first (and the last) president. The
communist ideology was very strict, especially in the postwar years, and this firm rule was justified by the need to
keep stability in the country that was now under the
political pressure from both the west (the US and Western
Europe), and the east (the Soviet Union). In attempts to
keep the political balance, Yugoslavia was soon one of the
founders and leaders of the Non-Alignment movement. Another
powerful binding force of the country was the very strong
Yugoslav People's Army, known all around the world for its
technological achievement, and which structure was comprised
of 70% Serbs.
In order for the crimes and the bad blood from the past to
be forgotten, national and religious feelings were
suppressed with the idea of "brotherhood and unity", made up
to reconcile the constituent nations that fought each other
severely in the Second World War. Lacking a majority people,
it "opted for cultural diversity in modern parlance the
salad bowl rather than the melting pot." (10) In spite of the
attempts, this policy was not always successful. During the
early seventies, the period also known as the "Croatian
spring", the nationalist movement in Croatia initially
gained many supporters, but the regime reacted to it, "as if
it were nothing more than a separationist
movement. Croatia
was disciplined and silenced." (11).
Regarding the position of churches during this period, it is
important to stress again that religious feelings of peoples
have been suppressed for ideological reasons but also the
fear that the churches could serve as potential sources of
nationalist feelings. The deep mistrust and even animosity
between the churches and the state was not helped by legal
liberalisation of religion during the sixties and seventies.
Geert Van Dartel sees the churches under communism this way:
"None of the religious communities really felt free and at
ease under the communist rule... They were constantly under
attack, pressurised and marginalized as enemy-figures. The
Roman Catholic Church in Croatia was labelled as 'cleronationalist' and 'clero-fascist'; the Serbian Orthodox

Church was also labelled as extremely nationalistic... For
more than 40 years the complexes and traumas that were very
much present
within the churches were kept under the
surface". (12)
On the other side, the churches have very often used
communism as an excuse for their own inability to keep pace
with the modernisation and secularisation that was rapidly
changing the profile of Yugoslav society. Their own slowness
to recognise the challenges was masked with isolation
imposed by the government. To some extent, the Roman
Catholic Church in Croatia tried to face the problem of
secularisation through good organisation of religious
education and publishing new catechetic material, but the
Serbian Orthodox Church and its theologians completely
ignored the issue, "perhaps as a consequence
of their image
of religious truth as fixed and static." (13)
CATACLYSM OF COMMUNISM
The president-for-life J. B. Tito died in 1980, and the
following years were characterised with the incapability of
the group presidency rule, emerging nationalism, and
realisation that the relatively high standard of living,
especially in comparison with other East European countries,
was actually based on the money received from the
International Monetary Fund. This severe debt crisis was
accompanied by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1989 and radical changes in the political systems of the
surrounding countries.
With the fall of communism, the churches found themselves in
a new situation. Finally free of oppression, the churches
hoped to regain the influence they had before the communist
rule. In a way, it was their opinion that they have deserved
it, being for decades the only bearers of national identity.
For instance, on one occasion, Patriarch Pavle of the
Serbian Orthodox Church describes it as, "the centuries-long
Guardian of Serbian spirituality and national and culturalhistorical being" (14)
In that sense, the new governments and religious leaders
worked hand in hand, because they both tried to erase the
memory of the former rule. The churches were challenged to
fill in the social gap left behind the long-lasting atheism.
Yet, the flock has changed - after both the forty years of
communism and the influence of the secularised Western
Europe, the country was actually de-Christianised to a great
extent. Pluralism brought in the game some new cultural
shapers, and, among these, some new denominations or
religions. Instead of joining forces and finding the real
core of the problem (which always demands a certain effort),
with their resources and energies limited, the churches used

an easier method that they knew to be useful from their past
experience. They looked for a scapegoat to put the blame on,
and subsequently turned against each other.
This phenomenon was reflected in two ways among Christians
in the area of former Yugoslavia. One was the enmity between
the two major churches, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the
Roman Catholic Church in Croatia, that was gradually fuelled
with the rise of the ethnic conflict between Serbs and
Croats. Another way is the phobic response to all the other
denominations and new religious movements. It is especially
a delicate affair in the case of many Protestant
denominations, like for example the Baptist or the Methodist
Church, that are now too easily mistaken with "sects". It is
interesting to note that the members of these churches are
also accused of "undermining the national cause", because
being a "good Croat", for example, implies being a "good
Catholic", and the identification of a religion with an
ethnic group does not leave much space for alternatives in
any direction.
PART THREE: THE CIVIL WAR
SEPARATIONIST MOVEMENTS
In 1991, the two richest republics, Slovenia and Croatia,
both declared independence. About 82% of population in
Slovenia were Slovenes, without any significant minority
group, which made the separation rather "easy". Yet, in the
case of Croatia it was much more difficult, due to the fact
that 13% of its population were ethnic Serbs. Helped by the
very strong Yugoslav People's Army, which was governed from
Belgrade, ethnic Serbs who lived in Croatia took arms and
fought the new government. Like a wave, the flames of war
caught Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992, when Muslims
(44% of the Bosnian population) and ethnic Croats (15%)
declared independence from the Belgrade regime and elected
their own government, while the Bosnian Serbs (33%)
boycotted these elections. The leading political parties of
all three sides organised their own (para)military forces,
and the civil war that began lasted for more than four
years. It was characterised by genocide, ethnic cleansing,
concentration camps, mass murders and rape, siege and
systematic destruction of towns and villages, more than
300.000 victims, and almost two million uprooted people.
FACING ETHNICITY
The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was, at first sight,
a classical example of a modern conflict - it is a conflict
between three indigenous ethnic groups within a particular
state. Nevertheless, there are voices stating that such a
definition cannot be applied in the Bosnian case.

Primarily, there is a question of ethnicity. Namely, two of
the groups, Serbs and Croats, are indisputably ethnic groups
related to a particular religion, Orthodoxy and Catholicism,
respectively, but the issue of the Bosnian Muslims as an
ethnic group was many times defied by both the Serb and
Croat side. Muslims from Bosnia have always been considered
as a religious and cultural group, nevertheless, their
definition as an ethnic group dates as late as 1974, when
the right of a constituent nation was granted to this group
by the late J. B. Tito. Even after this legalisation of
their ethnic status, many Muslims still declared themselves
officially as Yugoslavs, all the way up to the late
eighties, when the rise of ethnic tensions in Bosnia brought
about the awakening of the Muslim national identity, too.
Another question, related also to the primary concern, is
the issue of being an indigenous group. There were attempts
at, again both Serbs and Croats, to see Muslims in this area
as intruders, connecting the beginning of Islam in Bosnia
with the conquest of Bosnia by the Ottoman Empire in the
fifteenth century. One view of this period is that Bosnian
Muslims of today are descendants of Turkish invaders,
therefore giving them the status of unwanted newcomers. The
other view is that they are the descendants of islamicized
Slavs, which allegedly "legitimised" the claims of, for
example, Croat side that the Bosnian Muslims are actually
Croats. This idea has roots in the ideology of Ante
(15)
from the
Starcevic, "the father of Croatian nationalism"
second half of the nineteenth century. One slogan used
during the civil war said that Muslims are actually "Croat
flowers".
Yet, in any case, five hundred years is a period that is
long enough for creating a sense of national identity within
a group, especially bearing in mind the historical situation
that for centuries constantly stressed if not national at
least the religious difference. In his view of a similar
situation, negating Palestinian identity by the Israelis,
Nicholas Wolterstorff said that,
"One of the surest ways to intensify a group's feeling of
national identity, where those are weak, is to wound the
group. If Palestinians were not a nation, as so many Jewish
leaders have insisted, they have certainly become one" (16)
Another argument in this discussion could be that ethnic
groups are self-defining. On the contrary to the case of
religion, there are no rules declaring who can be a member
of a certain ethnic group, or what the group itself is, and
therefore creating national identity is a long-lasting but
spontaneous process. Nevertheless, sometimes it happens that
a certain criteria formation appears within a group. In the

framework of Bosnian war, members of the same ethnic group
were described as, for example, "good Serbs" or "bad Serbs":
"A person of Serbian 'descent' who rejects the national
identity crafted by the leaders of the Serbian community and
wishes to participate in politics as an individual or
through a civic party or broad coalition, does not present
an alternative Serbian or civic identity. She is merely a
traitor to the nation, characterised in the media as a selfhater or collaborator with the enemy. Members of the peace
movement in Serbia are a good example". (17)
NATIONALISM - THE SOCIAL PLAGUE OF THE CENTURY
This quotation is also a good example of nationalism in full
bloom, when it has reached such an extent that all that is
of concern is The Nation. N. Woltenstorff has given his
definition of nationalism as:
"A nation's preoccupation with its own nationhood. Instead
of the members simply living their life together as a
nation, they become preoccupied with their national
existence - rather like the man who constantly checks his
pulse rather than simply going about his tasks and letting
his heart do its work". (18)
The national being gains the supreme importance, and the
interest of the group supersedes the interests of an
individual within the group itself. And, if such is a case
of compatriots, what could be the destiny of dominant ethnic
minorities? They are unfortunately in most of the cases left
with:
"Only two choices: either to emigrate, under varying degrees
of duress, or to accept the status of second-hand citizens,
with varying degrees of deprivation of rights(19)
and
repression. There is never any other choice"
Here Wolterstorff was talking about the peaceful choices,
but regretfully there is a violent one, too. The minorities
feel so much excluded from the benefits of the state that
the general feeling becomes the one that trying to change
the situation as such by force cannot make things worse than
they are. In the case of the war in former Yugoslavia, it
happened that primarily in 1991 the Croatian government did
not show any desire to accommodate political and cultural
interests of the Serb minority. The response was the latter
fighting the government they found oppressive. In the case
of Bosnia, the Muslim-Croat government was trying to assure
again the Serb minority that their rights will be dutifully
respected. Nevertheless, after the Croatian experience,

there was not much confidence left with Serb politicians and
their followers.
It would be interesting to see how the problem of ethnic
groups was viewed generally through the prism of the state's
well-being. Immanuel Kant thought that:
"Nature employs two means to keep peoples from being mixed
and to differentiate them: the difference of language and of
religion. These differences occasion the inclination toward
mutual hatred and the excuse for war; yet at the same time
they lead, as culture increases and men gradually come
closer together, toward a greater agreement on principles of
peace and understanding." (20)
It happened that, not just in the civil war but on many
occasions throughout the history in former Yugoslavia, the
"inclination toward mutual hatred" often took the role of
the winner very easily. Another remark related to the
overall situation would be that all of the post-communists
governments of former Yugoslav republics claim to be
democratic, and at the same time exercise oppression or even
tacitly approve of the ethnic cleansing of minorities, which
is somewhat in opposition to the opinions of J. Burnham:
"The fundamental characteristic of democracy ... is the
concession of the right of political expression to
minorities",(21)
and Lord Acton, according to whom,
"The most certain test by which we judge whether a country
is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by
minorities", (22)
Obviously, in that sense, all of these new governments still
have an enormous task in front of them if they would really
like to prove the democracy and freedom they allegedly grant
to all of their citizens.
THE CHURCHES' RESPONSE TO NATIONALISM
Religion and the issue of ethnicity have always been closely
linked, as very important components of group identity, and
also as being able to raise the level of human passion in
conflicts. For these reasons, and in an area marked by
constant warfare, the role of religions in the Balkans
politics has never been simple. From the eight century
onwards both Catholicism and Orthodoxy have been the keepers
of national identity of the related ethnic groups. During
the communists' time it was done under suppression, but both
the churches and the nations managed to survive. With the

fall of communism and ethnic conflicts erupting,
"yesterday's dreams have turned into today's nightmares." (23)
The change was obvious long time before the actual emergence
of violent conflicts. Stella Alexander, a Quaker scholar,
noted it a whole decade before the beginning of the civil
war:
"Religion, which in the beginning nurtured a sense of
national identity as one way of resisting assimilation by
alien powers, has been overtaken by the growth of
nationalism and has itself been weakened by secularisation
of present-day society; today (1982) there can no doubt
which is the stronger force. It is nationalism which feeds
religious feelings, while the churches cling desperately to
their role as guardians of the soul of the nation." (24)
The civil war in former Yugoslavia was not a religious war,
and this a statement that was on numerous occasions repeated
by religious leaders and theologians. Still, talking about
religion, violence and conflict resolution, Marc Gopin warns
that:
"There are two dangers to highlight the importance of
religion: (1) that analysts and activists, in their
enthusiasm about religion's positive contribution to
conflict resolution overlook its violent potential, and (2)
that analysts will overemphasise religion's role and not see
it as a part of a complex array of factors that generate
violence and peacemaking." (25)
Therefore, the roles of churches should not be taken as
being the primary generators of violence. Yet, accepting a
statement like, for instance, that "Islam in no way
contributed to the setting of the bloody scene in Bosnia" (26)
for granted, without the thorough discussion of the relation
between the religions and political strategies that caused
the war, would not be realistic.
One of the most precise analyses of the partition of
religions in the Yugoslav conflict was written by Srdjan
Vrcan, professor of law at the University of Split, Croatia.
Here is the way Vrcan examines the most important aspects of
the process of religionization of politics:
1. A systematic and permanent inclination to lend
essentially religious attributes and connotations to some
key political concepts in everyday usage ('sacred Croatia',
'celestial Serbia', 'sacred will of the nation', and so on.)
2. The ontologism of existing social, political and cultural
differences, projecting them on to a metaphysical
backdrop... presenting the conflict between different and

opposed human types, irreconcilable cultures, antagonistic
types of civilisations.
3. A pervading and systematic manichaenism applied to
current conflict... one of the opposed parties being
portrayed as an angelic personification of Good and the
other as a diabolic incarnation of Evil.
4. An interpretation of national history in terms of a
sacred martyrology (mostly on the part of the Serbia) or
Calvary (the case of Croatia).
5. The nations involved are eternalised in terms of some
kind of Urvolk and in terms of their fundamental allegedly
suprahistorical immutable qualities.
6. Official interpretations of recent political events to a
theory of diabolic conspiracy (involving Masons, Jews, the
Comintern, the Vatican) against this or that nation." (27)
Now, what happened to the teachings of the churches?
Although "the church has a tradition of millennia,
while
politicians cannot count more than on life-time" (28), they
have lost this race under the pressure of every day
politics. What the Christians involved in this conflict have
forgotten is stated by Wolterstorff as:
"As Christian struggle to diminish the conflict of nation
against the nation in the world today they will not forget
the life of that other nation to which they belong, that
'holy nation', in Peter's words, the church of Jesus Christ
- 'elect from every nation, yet one o'er all the earth'.
After Pentecost God's chosen people on earth no longer
excludes the members of any natural grouping - neither Greek
nor Jew, female nor male, slave nor free. It does not
exclude them because it transcends them. Without destroying
all those old loyalties, it transforms them: they become
enrichments
of this one new nation. So at least it was meant
(29)
.
to be."

PART FOUR: PEACE AT LAST
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
The peace process can never begin with a peace settlement it should rather be said that the settlement is a crown to
the long-lasting efforts. Fortunately, not all the religious
leaders in former Yugoslavia have forgotten that the basis
of the Christian faith, according to the Archbishop John
Foley, is shown in three levels of biblical love:
"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you;"

"Love your neighbour as you love yourself;"
"Love one another as I have loved you".

(30)

What follows is a chronological presentation of the most
significant peacemaking initiatives coming from the Serbian
Orthodox Church, and the Roman Catholic Church in Bosnia and
Croatia.
The first one to be mentioned is a prayerful gathering at
Assissi, Italy, in January 1992, announced by Pope John Paul
II "to invoke peace on Europe and particularly on the
Balkans."(31) Besides Catholic Episcopal Conferences,
representatives of 47 delegations came also from the
Orthodox, Anglican, Protestant, and Old Catholic churches
and communities, as well as persons of the Jewish and Muslim
religions, who prayed according to their traditions. The
Serbian Patriarch Pavle was unable to attend the meeting,
yet in the message he sent to the Holy Father, the Patriarch
asked for a delegation of the Serbian Orthodox Church to be
received in Rome, with a view
of a possible meeting between
(32)
.
the Patriarch and the Pope
This visit took place in April 1993, when Metropolitan
Amfilohije of Montenegro and the Coastland, and Bishop
Irinej of BaÃƒÂ¨ka were received by the Pope and had
discussions with the Pontifical Council for Promoting
Christian Unity. The theme of the discussions was the role
of Christians in the current situation involving the
countries of former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, where a
profound process of reconciliation between the various
peoples was urgently needed.(33)
Another event of great importance took place at the Sarajevo
airport in May 1994, where an Orthodox delegation, led by
the Russian patriarch Aleksij II and the Serbian patriarch
Pavle, met a Catholic delegation led by Cardinal KuhariÃƒÂ¦
and the Archbishop of Vrhbosna (Sarajevo) Msgr PuljiÃƒÂ¦.
However, the Islamic community refused to take part in a
meeting with Patriarch Pavle, and were later informed on the
agenda by Cardinal KuhariÃƒÂ¦. The Orthodox delegation also
used this opportunity to meet with Radovan Karad_iÃƒÂ¦, the
then leader of Bosnian Serbs, at his headquarters at Pale.
In September 1994, one million worshippers gathered in
Zagreb, Croatia, for a mass celebrated by Pope John Paul II
to mark the ninth centenary of the Church in this country.
To the disappointment of Croatian nationalists, the Pope
used this opportunity to call for the solidarity of the
peoples of former Yugoslavia and declare that peace in the
Balkans is not a utopia:

"The present tragic divisions and tensions should not make
us forget that there are many elements which unite the
peoples who are at war today... Beyond all the differences,
origins, nationalities, there is a basic unity linking every
human being, and we Christians are called to witness to it
with special strength and responsibility. Would it not be
intolerable hypocrisy to repeat the Our Father while
harbouring feelings of resentment and hatred, or even ideas
of retaliation and revenge? ... It is time for the Church in
Zagreb and in the whole of Croatia to become promoters of
mutual forgiveness and reconciliation. 'To ask forgiveness
and to forgive': the commitment incumbent on all can be
summarised in these words, if there is a desire to take
firm
preliminary steps to reach a true and lasting peace." (34)
Just one of many meetings convened by these ecumenical
bodies, and the last one in this presentation, is the
meeting with bishops of the Council of European Bishops'
Conferences (CCEE) and the Conference of European Churches
(CEC), and representatives of religious communities in the
countries of former Yugoslavia in PÃƒÂ©cs, Hungary, in July
1995. In their joint statement, the church leaders
underlined that,
"By protecting and helping each other, and by building up
mutual respect and understanding through dialogue,
confidence and security can be enhanced... Pessimism and
despair can be challenged, if reconciliation is shown and
proved to be both necessary and possible." (35)
During the same year there were also two major initiatives
of the Serbian Orthodox Church in promoting co-operation
with the Catholic Church in former Yugoslavia. The first was
a visit of an Orthodox bishop on behalf of the Holy Synod to
the bishop of the Catholic community in Banjaluka, Msgr
Franjo Komarica, as sign of fraternity in his isolation. The
other event was participation of Bishop Lavrentije of _abac
- Valjevo in the "Pilgrimage of the European Youth" in
Loreto, Italy, September 1995. It was reported that, "not
only did the Patriarch allow Bishop Lavrentije to accept the
invitation, but it was the whole episcopate gathered at the
Council of Bishops of the
SOC, who decided to send him as
(36)
their representative."
Yet, it would be highly unfair to draw this chapter to a
close without paying due respect to many unknown lay persons
and clergy in all the war-affected countries, who all
throughout the war organized prayers for peace, meetings and
workshops for religious people from the opposed sides,
helped in the distribution of interchurch humanitarian aid,
and other activities that showed really a genuine Christian
love towards their sisters and brothers in Jesus Christ.

THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
As an answer to these prayers, after four and a half years
of unsuccessful cease-fires, the peace agreement was finally
signed by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia in
Dayton, Ohio, in December 1995. All the Serb occupied
territories in Croatia were given back to this new state.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a united country that now consists
of the Muslim-Croat federation and the Republic of Srpska,
the entity held by Bosnian Serbs. The recent democratic
elections gave no reason for hope - the same parties that
started the war were elected again. Repatriation of Bosnian
refugees, that is urged by some Western European countries
led by Germany, is almost impossible, because the homes of
these people are mostly taken by other refugees who were
also forced to leave their homes somewhere else, and so on,
in a vicious circle. Another dark cloud above the future of
Bosnia are landmines, spread across the whole territory, and
especially along the inter-ethnic boundary lines.
Yet, let us go back to the Peace Agreement, supported by the
powerful presence of the multinational Implementation Forces
(IFOR). But is it not contradictio in adjecto - peace by
force? Can there be reconciliation if the peace did not come
from the hearts of the conflicting sides, out of the genuine
desire for the end of the war, but just because it was
enforced by the foreign powers and ensured by their
military? Robert Schreiter calls this kind of process
"reconciliation as hasty peace", that
"tries to escape an examination of the causes of suffering.
If the causes of suffering are not addressed, suffering is
likely to continue; the wheel of violence keeps turning, and
more and more people get crushed. Reconciliation is a
process that cannot
be foreshortened; it keeps its own
(37)
timetables."
To prove the accuracy of this thesis in the Bosnian case,
here is a fragment of the report on the first phase of
implementation of the Peace Agreement by UN High
Representative Carl Bildt from March 1996:
"Three months after the Peace Agreement was signed, we must
regrettably conclude that the forces of ethnic separation
are still far stronger than the forces of ethnic
reintegration... No lasting peace can be built without a
genuine commitment to reconciliation, but nothing is as
difficult after a war as bitter and brutal as the war in
Bosnia has been as this. Reconciliation will be possible
when there is a common perception that justice for all will
be created, and when the energies and efforts of the people
of Bosnia and Herzegovina are concentrated less on the

legacies of
the bitter past than on the promise of a common
future." (38)
The Peace Agreement found very diverse response with the
leaders of the religious communities in the area. Cardinal
Vinko PuljiÃƒÂ¦, head of the Catholic Church in Bosnia, has
sharply criticised the US-brokered Dayton accord to end the
Balkan war for ignoring the "yearning of nations for
freedom" and the requirements of "peace and justice". In his
opinion, the accord could not be "trusted or celebrated",
since it "legalised ethnic cleansing" in a region where
rival ambitions still existed for a "Greater Serbia" and
"Greater Croatia". "Perhaps this peace is just an extension
of the(39)
war, albeit not quite as dramatic," the cardinal
said.
Still, his remarks were very much in the opposition with the
statement on the Dayton Agreement given by the Pope, who
said it marked "an important movement in Europe's history"
and urged the international community to "show real
spiritedness in helping the former Yugoslavia's material,
social and spiritual reconstruction." (40)
Within the Serbian Orthodox Church reactions to the
agreement were different as well. During the talks in
November 1992, before the accord was signed, Patriarch Pavle
approved the role of the Serbian president Milo_eviÃƒÂ¦ as a
negotiator on behalf of all Serbs. When the negotiations
were successfully ended, some members of the Holy Synod
openly castigated the Patriarch, threatening with their own
resignations unless the Patriarch withdrew his approval of
Milo_eviÃƒÂ¦'s negotiating (41)
position. Beleaguered, the
Patriach finally complied.
IS RECONCILIATION A REAL OPTION?
Now that peace has been at least technically achieved, the
next "hot issue" on the Bosnian agenda is reconciliation.
The primary question is, can there be any reconciliation
without justice? And, if so, how can justice be done without
being subjective, and without causing further conflicts? The
atrocities of the former Yugoslav civil war are a fact, and
the charges against war criminals have been pressed at the
International Court of Justice in the Hague. For instance,
Simon Wiesenthal described the Serb regime's assault against
Bosnia as a clearcut case of genocide, adding that,
"You
(42)
Yet, the
don't have to kill everyone to have genocide"
attitude of Justice Richard Goldstone, the Prosecutor of the
International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, seems to
be somewhat less explicit in that sense. When asked about
the rough balance of crimes committed by Serbs, Croats and
Muslims throughout the war, he answered that,

"It's not a judgement. It would be unhelpful, improper and
inappropriate
to say that one side is more guilty than the
other." (43)
War criminals must be punished, it is acknowledged on all
sides, but it is almost always followed by the defensive
addition that it was not "our side", but "the other". In his
Notes on Nationalism, George Orwell said that,
"The nationalist not only does not disapprove on atrocities
committed by his own side, but he has
a remarkable capacity
for not even hearing about them!" (44)
The next question is the one of the appropriateness of
reconciliation itself, formulated as the doubt that it is
not the right time for reconciling the Balkan enemies. There
was too much bloodshed and atrocities during the war, and
some time is required for the healing of wounded memories this is a very common attitude. Yet, will not the process
escape control if it is given too much time on its own? The
experiences with a similar situation following the Second
World War did not end with a constructive outcome. On the
contrary, the suppression of the hurt made it explode almost
half a century later. Just like there can never be a
suitable moment for waging a war, it is always a suitable
time for reconciliation. This process is difficult and
extremely demanding, and historical circumstances in antebellum periods are never kind to it, so, for that reason,
any delay may just cause multiple additional obstacles.
Reconciliation also does not have a "suitable" place, it can
equally be initiated on the side of the victimised as on the
side of the oppressors. It is the opposite of forgetting the memory should not be erased, but, at the same time, it
must be treated in a very careful manner. Instead of being a
threat and fuel for future conflicts, it should be a warning
of the road to hell where chauvinism and exclusion can lead.
The boundary between exclusion and embrace is called
forgiveness,(45) plain, and pure, Christian forgiveness, for
our Father forgives us as we are forgetting the trespasses
of others. Can churches get involved in the reconciliation
process if they have taken part in the conflict? Their
involvement is an obvious fact, and though the former
Yugoslav war was not a religious war in the same sense as,
for instance, the crusades, it would be far from truth to
say that the churches have been passive. Nevertheless, it
could be viewed as a positive challenge to their leaders and
congregations to compensate for the misdeeds of the past.
For, finally, for Christians reconciliation is a mission of
supreme importance. It is a ministry given by the Lord (2
Cor 5:18) and before facing God we must be reconciled with
our brothers (Mat 5:23-24). Christian faith has to be proved
as orthopraxis, because

"Christian theology does not stop at these doctrinal issues.
If we are to love God, we are to love our neighbours too;
the word of reconciliation applies also to human conflict
situations, and there requires
the same acceptance of both
grace and responsibility " (46)
In this case, both Catholics and Orthodox in the area of
former Yugoslavia have responsibility and a task in the
reconciliation process in their war-ravaged countries.
SIGNS OF HOPE
Apart from the change of concrete war policy, accompanied,
unfortunately, with just few adjustments within the
political structures on all sides, there have been obvious
changes in the attitudes of the churches as well. These
(47)
as a
shifts have been described by Sr℘ ℜ∂ an Vrcan
change from unconditional and total legitimacy given
previously to the dominant political strategies of some kind
of conditional and limited legacy, as well as an erosion of
the previous religious unanimity in this respect.
Nevertheless, regardless of the initial extent, it is still
a shift in a positive direction, and it also might represent
a germ of future development of churches' response to
temporary affairs that would be significantly less dependent
on everyday course of political decisions. In the Serbian
Orthodox Church this change has been seen in the dissent
with the official Serb state politics and president
Milo_eviÃƒÂ¦, improving openness, and strengthening
ecumenical cooperation on all levels. The Roman Catholic
Church in Croatia began to confront nationalism and stand
for human rights, with preparedness to look for the culprits
within its own ranks.
In the practical sense, proofs of this new course are
evident. There are several inter-religious dialogue
initiatives developing at this moment, but here the two most
important ones will be mentioned. The first Department for
Inter-Religious Dialogue in Europe will be opened in
Sarajevo, at the city's partly destroyed university. A cofounder, Paul Mojzes, editor of the US-based Journal of
Ecumenical Studies, said that the department would include
professors from all religious traditions, as well as
lecturers on ethics and peace-making, and would aim to
rebuild interfaith tolerance after four years of war. An
ecumenical committee would ensure the "political
independence" of department staff-members from their
respective religious groups. Mojzes also said he believed
the new department's inter-religious character would
help
(48)
minority Serbs and Croats to regain confidence.

Soon after this idea was launched, there was another
international initiative to cement peace in the Balkans.
Namely, the leaders of former Yugoslavia's Catholic and
Serbian Orthodox Churches have agreed to cooperate on a
joint history project, under the auspices of a Vienna-based
commission. This project would promote a "new way of
thinking" about the region's inter-faith conflicts, and it
has been personally approved by Patriarch Pavle of Belgrade
and Cardinal KuhariÃƒÂ¦ of Zagreb. The commission is
sponsored by Pro Oriente, an independent forum established
by Cardinal KÃƒÂ¶nig of Austria in 1964 for promoting ties
between Eastern and Western churches. Its working groups
would study the role of propaganda and "hostile images", and
recruit young scholars for specific research tasks, with the
aim of an objective picture of(49)
recent Balkan history which
can be accepted by all sides.

CONCLUSION
The urgent need for reconciliation among the peoples
and religions of former Yugoslavia is a screaming
fact. If the long-awaited peace does not find a solid
ground in the true conversion of the hearts of
people, it might easily be broken by new acts of
violence, as continuation of the overwhelming
conflicts from the past. And what could be the final
message for the leaders and congregations of the
divided religious communities? Here are some
suggestion given at the Ecumenical Dialogue on
Reconciliation held in Belgrade, Serbia, February
1996, and organized by the Conference of European
Churches and Theological Faculty of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, with participants representing
Christian denominations from Bosnia,
Croatia, Serbia,
(50)
and Europe and the United States.
Reconciliation is at the center of all life. It
begins first with the self and one's own community,
and requires a readiness to repent, forgive and
accept forgiveness.
Reconciliation calls for action. Without repentance
and compassionate and supportive action
reconciliation is an empty word.
Reconciliation involves taking risks and
responsibilities. The steps taken by Christians and
their neighbours at the local level can be a powerful
challenge to national and international leaders.

Finally, there is an eternal reminder and example to
be followed - the teaching and life of Jesus Christ,
the message of love and peace he endowed us with. In
the same manner, with simply remaining faithful to
the spirit of their religion, and approving that we
are all children of one father, Catholics and
Orthodox believers from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia
could give their deepest and most profound
contribution to reconciliation in their countries.
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